Having enjoyed another book by Victor Davis Hanson, The Soul of Battle, I picked this one up when a copy was put up for sale at the Hayward, Wisconsin Public Library over the Memorial Day weekend. Since reading Thucydides freshman year at Grinnell College, the history of the Peloponnesian War has held interest. This account was no disappointment. Indeed, compared to others, it was original.

The originality of Hanson's book is that he doesn't summarize Thucydides and the Oxyrhinchos Historian. He assumes some background on the part of the reader and proceeds instead to detail the war in terms of its practice, focusing on its innovations. Thus one learns about siegecraft, hoplite battle, trireme tactics--precisely the kinds of details that Thucydides assumed his readership familiar with. Doing so, A War No Other serves as a useful adjunct to the normal high school or college reading assignment.

Beyond that, Hanson writes with an intention of exploring and exploding common misconceptions of the decades-long conflict between the ancient democratic imperialists of Athens and the oligarchical traditionalists of Sparta. One, of course, is the usual exaggeration of the goodness of Athens during its "golden age" from the defeat of Persia until at least the plague during the war. Although a radical democracy in ways quite different than ours, Athens was also, by the standards of its time, an imperialist superpower and bully, maintaining its far-flung commercial interests by means of tribute and an unmatched fleet. Sparta, however, while the bully of the Peloponnese, was the advocate of what today would be termed "national self-determination." A land power, it felt increasingly threatened by Athenian innovations and self-aggrandizing encroachments and became, with Thebes and Corinth, a leader of liberation movements throughout the Greek-speaking world extending from the Black Sea to Egypt to Asia Minor to Italy and Sicily. Of course, it wasn't as simple as that moralistic calculus might imply. Athens really did generally promote a kind of democracy in that its client poleis tended to favor egalitarianism while Sparta's notions of self-determination tended to mean oligarchical rule.

The irony of the war is (1) that innovative, proto-capitalist Athens lost against reactionary Sparta and (2) that Sparta won by adopting many of the innovations which they, and their proponents Plato, originally decried. The consequence of the Athenian defeat, moreover, were unintended. Sparta, long in decline, ended up becoming a virtual client of Persia before its defeat at the hands of formerly-allied Thebes and Athens, after a period of dictatorship, returned to democratic power to ally with its former Theban enemies in overthrowing oligarchies established by the Spartiates. Meanwhile, military innovations introduced by the war were perfected to the north and the whole hellenic order of things was overthrown by the Philip and his son Alexander.

Hanson's focus, however, is primarily with things military and the myths he attacks are both ancient and modern. A primary one is that of hoplite warfare, a form of warfare identified with the virtues of a yeoman citizenry. In fact, as he shows, very little hoplite battle was conducted during the Peloponnesian war. Calvary, light infantry and marines were coming to the fore and the fighters were increasingly the lumpen, slaves and mercenaries. Further, as in almost all wars, the real misery, quantitatively speaking, was more from the externalities of conflict than from the direct exercise of it. Far and away the greatest dying on Athens' part occurred during its plague and resulted from the Periclean strategy of avoiding infantry contests with the invading Spartans.

Hanson, a farmer himself, brings to his book much information about the ancient economics of warfare. How much did a trireme cost to build and maintain exactly? How much the hoplite panoply? How easy was it, really, for the occupying Spartans to devastate the Attic countryside? Were did the food come from?--the money?history21 s David Rubenstein820 2,649

This book put ancient Greece into an entirely new light for me. The war was sporadic, but altogether lasted about 30 years. Athens was the great democracy, with a large empire of states it had conquered. Athens was the technologically superior Greek state. It relied on its advanced navy with better ships and better naval tactics. Sparta was autocratic, technologically backward, and relied on its heavy-duty infantry. Sparta also had a large number of allied states in Peloponnesia.

After a year or so into the war, a great plague hit ancient Greece very hard. Rural farmers immigrated into the city walls of Athens, which helped contribute to the high death rate in Athens. Just as many people died from disease, as from the war!

This is a history book few others; it does not detail the war in a chronological fashion. Instead, each chapter describes a theme in some detail. A chapter on each of the city states, a chapter on infantry, on cavalry, on the navy, on slavery, tactics, torture, terrorism, and on politics. This helps to give an overall view of societies at the time. The author helps the reader to understand the concepts, by comparing the historical events in ancient Greece to better-known historical events in modern times. These analogies really helped my understanding of the attitudes and events in the history.

I didn't read this book; I listened to the audiobook version, narrated by Bob Souer. He reads the book very well, in a pleasant, straight-forward manner. Highly recommended!audiobook history21 s paper0r0ss0648 48

Una guerra tra superpotenze, forse la prima guerra civile occidentale, considerando la medesima matrice culturale e storica: Sparta contro Atene, 431-404 a.C., quasi trent'anni di guerra, imboscate, battaglie campali, scontri navali, epidemie, ma soprattutto assedi alle citta, massacri indiscriminati, incursioni, esecuzioni sommarie e atti di puro terrorismo (rimane impressa l'azione dei Traci inviati da Atene a Micalesso che macellarono tutti gli scolari della popolosa scuola elementare). Da una parte la oligarchica, reazionaria, militarista, capitale laconica, dall'altra la democratica, imperialista, progressiva Atene. Differenze diametrali, inconciliabili, che trovarono un terreno di tragica comunanza nella conduzione di una guerra che abbandonava ogni richiamo alla tradizionale ritualizzazione degli scontri che aveva caratterizzato il passato. Se nei secoli VII-VI a.C. lo scontro campale tra falangi oplitiche rappresentava la regola per la risoluzione relativamente cruenta delle dispute tra societa' ancora agricole, con la Guerra del Peloponneso si ebbe un deciso scarto verso la modernita' del conflitto, verso l'abbandono di ogni formalismo bellico a favore di scontri privi di regole militari ed etiche, caratterizzati spesso da una notevole asimmetria tra le forze in campo. Bellissimo libro e ancor meglio scritto e argomentato. Divulgazione storica di livello e qualita' assolutamente superiori.storia12 s Sud6662,068 167

"But the length of the Peloponnesian War was drawn out over a long time; and in the course of the war, disasters unfolded in Greece such as never had occurred in the comparable space of time. Never had so many cities been taken and left in ruins-some by Barbarians, others by Greeks themselves as they warred against each other. Indeed several of those cities captured suffered a change of inhabitants. Never had some many human beings been forced into exile or had there been so much bloodshed-either as a result of the war itself or the resulting civil insurrections."
-Thucydides

V.D. Hanson's magisterial account of the internecine conflict between the Greeks is a great read. A preeminent Classicist, Hanson looks at the War through an interesting eye. Most people seem unaware that the victors of battles such as Marathon and Thermopylae ended up fighting against each other. Even fewer realize that the Spartans, the erstwhile "heroes" of the movie 300, would end up getting financial help from the very same Persians they made their reputation against.

The Athenians with their Delian league was a sea-borne power. Sparta and the Peloponnesian League was a land power. This strange balance ended up making the conflict drag on for years beyond its course, as both sides tried to find strategies that worked.

The entire devastating conflict, its causes, and results are superbly explained by Dr. Hanson. He also brings the military historian's viewpoint to the forces and engagements of this lengthy war. Full of fascinating information and tidbits, this is a must-have book for anyone interested in the Peloponnesian War.



history11 s GoldGato1,185 40

Ancient Greece never seemed to be a cohesive, united lot as each city-state focused on its own objectives. Alas, this led to the eventual end of the Golden Age of Athens, which always puzzled me. The Spartans were also intriguing, a society built around masculinity and warfare and the complete opposite of its sibling neighbour of Athens. Why did these two giants fight and what were the consequences?

Hanson provides a full chronology of the issues leading to battles won and lost and he also does a good job of helping the reader understand the politics behind it all. Athens, with all her liberality and genius, produced conformists as military leaders while Sparta, so closed within itself, bred generals of brilliance. As the Peloponnesian War progressed, Athenian citizens became mercenary and seemingly unaware they were no longer the center of the universe.

In a sense, it's a civil war which led to Alexander's Macedonian dominance and the future empire of Rome. The strong point of this book is how the author relates this ancient war to modern times. Are we re-living the same experience with different combatants today? Perhaps. It's a good read for those with an interest in ancient Greece and the politics that lead to conflict.

Perhaps war really is the father of us all.

Book Season = Autumn (squirrels vs. acorns)ancient-civilization autumn history ...more5 s Adam Meek385 23

Hanson gives us an accessible account of the ancient conflict between democracy & oligarchy-- recommended for any student of military history.history non-fiction5 s Bob2,025 655

Summary: An account of the Peloponnesian War tracing the history, the politics, the strategies, key figures, battles, and how the war was fought.

The war went on for twenty-seven years toward the end of the fifth century BC. One of the first great works of history by Thucydides chronicled the battle. Both Athens and Sparta experienced horrendous losses culminating in the near total destruction of the once-great Athenian naval power at Aegospotami in 405.

Victor Davis Hanson, a noted classical scholar, renders an account both of the history of the war but also who fought it and how they fought. The two principle powers were quite different. Sparta was an oligarchy, Athens a democracy. Sparta had a more powerful land army. Athens was a sea power with a protected port and good walls allowing them to endure siege as well as project their power. To begin, Sparta invaded every year or two overland, ravaging the countryside but exhausting itself while the population of Attica sheltered in Athens. Very few Athenians died in battle but the city was eviscerated by plague resulting from crowded and unhygienic conditions. Meanwhile the Athenian navy raided the coastal cities of Sparta. They fought ten years to a draw ending with the temporary Peace of Nicias.

The peace lasted until 415 when Athens decided to mount an attack on Sicily, a Spartan ally, stirred up by charismatic general Alcibiades. A diffident landing followed by an inconclusive siege gave time for Syracuse to arm and be reinforced. In 413 they defeated Athens navy and then chased down the land forces for a crushing defeat. Still Athens rebuilt while Sparta, aided by Alcibiades, who had changed sides, and material help from Persia, finally built a navy to rival what was left of the Athenian navy. They fought a series of battles in Ionia culminating in the utter defeat at Aegospotami in 405, and Athens surrender to Sparta, led by Lysander.

War has always been gruesome. Hanson describes the particular gruesomeness of war in this time, whether it was destruction by fire or the ravages of disease, which took Athens singular leader Pericles. War unravels any war ethic. Hanson chronicles the killing of civilians and captives, especially in later stages of the war. He considers the hoplites and the vulnerabilities of their armor to thrusts to the groin and neck, and lightly armored fighters with spears or armors. Hoplites were mostly fitted to fight other hoplites, and often suffered relatively light losses. They need mounted forces to protect their flanks. The lack of horses was a key factor in the defeat at Syracuse. Siege warfare had not yet been mastered. Siege towers and catapults emerged after these wars. Mostly, they built siege walls, rams, and tried to penetrate walls and gates with rams.

Ultimately the war hinged on the trireme, the three-tiered rowing vessel. The impasse between the two powers ended when Alcibiades, rejected by Athens, persuaded the Spartans that only by becoming a sea power could they defeat Athens. The defeat at Syracuse pointed the way. The trireme depended mostly on slaves, up to 200 per vessel in three banks of rowers. A rammed trireme could quickly sink with the ly death of all. This happened to 170 of 180 triremes of the Athenians at Aegospotami.

The fall of Athens resulted from a variety of unforeseen errors. Pericles was an unparalleled leader, but with no able successor. Alcibiades was brilliant but never trusted, and often absent at key moments. The Sicilian venture spelled the beginning of the end, depleting both manpower and treasury. The Athenians ignored Alicibiades, once again on their side, exposing themselves to surprise attack at Aegospotami.

Hanson traces the errors that arise from both hubris and the “fog of war.” These wars, many were filled with folly. The protracted conflict inevitably deteriorated to greater and greater brutality. Mediocre leadership cost the lives of thousands. The inadequacies of the technology of war led to innovation and more effective ways of killing. Alliances end up feeding the allies. Eventually both Persia and Thebes become the real threat.

It all began with the decision of Sparta to challenge the growth of Athenian power. A venture intended to last a few months turned into a 27 year conflict. Such are often the illusions of war. Hanson uses the lens of one protracted war to challenge us to ask the same questions about war in our own day.history history-military-history4 s Jane1,602 213

For a layperson myself this was an easy-to-read and fascinating introduction to the Peloponnesian War. Unorthodox in its approach, it was not strictly chronological. As the subtitle indicates, it tells HOW the two enemies fought this war. The title is taken from Thucydides, the historian, who wrote extensively on the war. He called it a "war no other." Each chapter treated a theme: Why the war was fought; the Spartans' ultimately unsuccessful scorched earth policy in Attica; outbreak and extent of disease; hoplite warfare; growing importance of horses and cavalry in warfare; naval warfare, then the author's conclusions. I d the analogies the author drew between incidents then and in subsequent warfare through the years. I was introduced to new names of military and naval leaders such as Brasidas; Archidamus; Nicias. I didn't realize the extent of Alcibiades' treachery. The man was certainly the quintessential amoral opportunist! Now I've learned about the ruthless Lysander, who finally defeated the Athenian fleet at Aegospotami [Goat Rivers]. For an expert in ancient Greek history, this book might be simplistic but it filled the bill excellently for me. The index was top-notch. Highly recommended.ancient-greece library nonfiction ...more4 s George195 1 follower

Summary
Victor Davis Hanson tells the story of the Peloponnesian war which is the war where Sparta and Athens fought for close to 30 years. This war starts shortly after Sparta and Athens had united to repel a Persian invasion, partially depicted in the movie 300. Ironically, this war was ultimately decided by Persia backing Sparta which broke the Athenians. For many, this war marks the end of the Greek Golden age. Taking place shortly before Alexander the Great's campaigns, it included many Western superstars Socrates, who participated in the early part of the war, Hippocrates, the father of medicine, and some of the eminent Greek tragedians Sophocles and Euripides. Hanson recasts the Peloponnesian War as a Greek Civil War, because much the American Civil War both sides shared language, culture, and many other inherited traditions, but they differed on governmental strategies. The Spartans are portrayed as being conservative oligarchs, while the Athenians were depicted as radical proponents of democracy. This difference in governing styles is often emphasized by Hanson, who uses it to explain the distinctive reactions of the two nation states to the challenges each in turn faced.
Thoughts
Hanson excels at setting the stage, making the job of seeing this slice of the Mediterranean easy. Sometimes feeling sweaty as you sympathize with a marching Hoplite Spartan soldier, wearing heavy bronze armor under a blazing sun in a windless valley, other times sympathizing with a sweaty Athenian oarsman in the bottom row of three rows, rowing for your life as your head is at "hip" level of the row of rowers above you. I am now realizing that you spend most of the time feeling sweaty and trying not to imagine what you would be smelling. Similar to one of those Triremes stuck in a doldrum, at times I felt the book dragged under the sheer weight of Greek names and places, followed by the endless back and forth of attacks and retaliations. However, memorable events the plague that ravaged Athens during a Spartan siege would breathe fresh air into the sails and we would be off again. One of my favorites of these memorable moments was the fascinating description of the siege on Plataea. The Peloponnesian War takes place at an interesting point in time where Greek siege craft technology had not caught up with Greek fortification technology. At this point there were no siege towers or torsion catapults. This detail means that the attackers were only left with ladders and rams as their siege weapons. Because of this in Plataea 400 defenders were able to hold off a sizeable Spartan army, even when they tried several other novel methods of breaching the city tunneling, fire, and primitive chemical warfare. After these unsuccessful attempts the Spartan army gave up on a direct assault and built a wall around the entire city and then began the slow process of attrition. At one point during the siege two hundred and twelve men made a daring escape. Unfortunately, their success also meant that the number of the city defenders had been halved. In spite of such a stalwart resistance the city eventually fell when the remaining defenders became too exhausted to carry on. Layers of depth are added to this history by the larger-than-life characters the Spartan general Brasidas and the romantic yet treacherous Alcibiades. Hanson extracts various morals from the historical events with varying degrees of success. While delving into "historical advice" for modern scenarios seems futile, as history rarely repeats itself identically, there appear to be general principles underscored in historical conflict that remain relevant across time. One such principle discussed by Hanson is the inherent self-preserving nature of nations, akin to living entities. When faced with existential threats, nations, much individuals, may and often do swiftly abandon their principles to save themselves. One need not look too hard in history to find many reminders of this potentiality.3 s Michael55 19

I enjoy reading classical Greek and Latin literature of all sorts: drama, poetry, and history, as well as books about these topics. So it was with the anticipation of something good that I sat down to read Hanson’s “A War No Other”. Hanson is a noted author, historian and classicist, so what could be more interesting than his take on the Peloponnesian war? A lot of things, actually.

Not that “A War No Other” is bad. Hanson, as has been noted in many , departs from the typical linear presentation of the war, taking instead a topical approach. In each chapter he examines the war as a whole through the lens of a particular aspect of the war. In “Armor”, he focuses on the life of the Greek Hoplite soldier, the main Hoplite battles, and how the nature of those battles changed radically from the opening to the closing of the war. wise in “Walls” he investigates the ancient Greek practice of siege warfare. Naval battles are discussed in “Ships”, cavalry in “Horses”, and so on. As he examines these topics in detail he also touches on several recurring themes, chief among them the cost of the war in material treasure, human lives, and the way the Peloponnesian war changed Western concepts of war forever. All of this is fascinating.

The issue I had was not with the information presented, but how it was presented. The topical approach simply did not work for me. It was too fragmented and disjoint. I felt I was reading the same story over and over again. True, each chapter varied from the last in topic, but too many of the events and characters were repeated. The narrative thread provided by a linear history was disrupted as those characters and events lost their normal place in a timeline. It did not help that this was my first reading of a book on the Peloponnesian war. Perhaps if I had already read Thucydides, “A War No Other” would have been more accessible.

On the whole, Hanson’s book is worthwhile, but I cannot recommend it to a newcomer to the war between Athens and Sparta. Start with Thucydides. I intend to make him my next stop.
3 s Dale1,794 66

A War No Other is classical historian Victor Davis Hanson's offering on the Peloponnesian War - the 27 year struggle between the Delian League (Athens and its allies) and the Peloponnesian League (Sparta and its allies) that ran on and off again from 431 to 404 B.C.

Hanson's book is perhaps also a "book no other" if I may borrow a phrase. Despite the prominently placed quote for the New York Times on the front cover proclaiming that it is a contemporary retelling of the war, this is not a narrative history of the war. Rather, it does exactly what the subtitle promises - it tells the reader HOW the war was fought. It analyzes the techniques, the weapons, the strategies and the tactics but it is not a history per se. The book vaguely follows the course of the war, but often shifts backwards and forwards through the decades of the war and even before and after the war.

Giving this one a rating is tricky. It is well-researched and well-written. Hanson does a tremendous job of linking the events of the past with more current events, such as World War II, the Cold War and terrorism. In a way, you could say that the quote (and title of the book) from the ancient historian Thucydides was really not true, this war was not a war no other, instead at least parts of it are every war that followed since...

Read more at: http://dwds.blogspot.com/2012/...3 s Pritam Chattopadhyay2,352 145

Book: A War No Other: How the Athenians & Spartans Fought the Peloponnesian War
Author: Victor Davis Hanson
Publisher: ? Random House Trade Paperbacks; Annotated edition (12 September 2006)
Language: ? English
Paperback: ? 416 pages
Item Weight: ? 471 g
Dimensions: ? 15.52 x 2.21 x 23.34 cm
Country of Origin: ? USA
Price: 1385/-

“Was Athens—or Greece itself—destroyed by the war? An entire industry of classical scholarship once argued for postwar Hellenic “decline,” and the subsequent tide of fourth-century poverty, social unrest, and class struggle as arising after the Peloponnesian War. Victorians, in turn, felt the loss was more a “what might have been,” a conflict that had ended not just the idea of Athens but “the glory that was Greece” itself and the Hellenic civilizing influence in the wider Mediterranean…”

From 431 to 404 a war raged across the Greek world from Sicily to the eastern Aegean, today ’ s modern Turkey, now known as the Peloponnesian War.

Such violence was not an extraordinary feature of Greek life, as Homer’s great poems tell and as the philosopher Heraclitus soon after proclaimed (c. 500) – ‘war is the father of all things ’.

The war between Athens, ‘leader of the Delian League of allied city-states and colonies’ against Sparta, ‘leader of the
Peloponnesian League’ pitted a prevailing Navy against one of the most overriding infantry forces in history.

Preceding this clash, Athens had defeated a Persian invasion force, at the Battle of Marathon. A decade later a much larger Persian invasion force suffered key setbacks and defeats at Thermopylae, where 300 Spartans distinctively fought to the last man.

Then at Salamis, the Persians were dealt a major naval defeat against the Athenian Navy and in conclusion at Plataea the Persian army was defeated on land, before downsizing and ultimately abandoning the campaign.

For the next half-century, both states followed an anti Persian policy and supported any anti Persian activities in the eastern Mediterranean, allowing for an sporadic peace to exist between Athens and Sparta. In order to fight the Persians at sea, the Athenians formed the Delian League by exercising progressive control over the members of the league.

Athens renovated this coalition into an empire, exacting tribute from its members. From the money extracted from her client states, Athens built herself into a city, which was the envy of the Hellenistic world.

And a fleet of 300 triple banked galleys each of these triremes was manned by a crew of a hundred and seventy professional oarsmen.

The city-state of Corinth had been the overriding maritime power prior to the Persian Wars. And as Athens’ power grew, her Navy outnumbered the Corinth fleet three-to-one and began to inflame rebellion in their colonies and intrude on its trade routes in a sequence of small conflicts lasting 15 years, known as the first Peloponnesian War.

Sparta opposed Athens and defeated the Athenian army in one non decisive engagement, while Athens continued to expand her naval power. One significant development during this period was the rebuilding of Athens’ walls on a grand scale, with an elongated causeway connecting Athens with the port city of Piraeus, allowing Athens to be completely supplied by sea, if an invading army would destroy the surrounding countryside and farmland.

This antagonistic period ended with the so-called ‘30 year’s peace’ between the two city-states, which would last for less than half of its intended duration. Despite this peace, antagonism between Athens and Corinth continued and in 431 BC Corinth productively convinced Sparta and the Peloponnesian League to declare war on Athens, with the goal of ending the swelling Athenian Empire.

The first phase of the second Peloponnesian War, commonly referred to as plainly the Peloponnesian War is known as Archidamian War. Here, Sparta pursued a policy of pillaging the countryside around Athens.

In an attempt to provoke a pitched battle, the Athenians had anticipated the Spartan strategy and had organized a continuous flow of grain shipments from Egypt and colonies on the Aegean and Black Sea coasts. The Athenian strategy was to barricade the Peloponnesian Peninsula from any trade and supplies, while opportunistically raiding Sparta's allies.

Initially the Athenians seemed to be maintaining the upper hand in this asymmetric war of attrition that had been carefully planned for years by the Athenian statesman Pericles.

The population from the surrounding countryside poured in behind the safety of the Athenian walls in the early stages of the war. This had been taken into account in advance and wealthy Athens had more than enough food flowing into the crowded city to feed everyone.

What had not been taken into account were the tainted grain shipments carrying plague, which speedily spread through the overloaded city.

Initially the city was pliant, inspired by the magnetic rhetoric of Pericles. An estimated one in four Athenians succumbed to the plague, including Pericles and his sons, before it had run its course.

At the height, mercenaries refused to fight for Athens and even the Spartans ceased to campaign near Athens for fear of catching the plague.

Ironically the extraordinarily planned Athenian blockade of the Peloponnese had protected Sparta and its allies from receiving any of the plague-tainted grain. The Athenian survivors adopted a much more violent strategy, greatly increasing the raids and building fortified outposts along the Peloponnese and coasts.

The ‘helots’ (Spartan slaves) that outnumbered them ten to one, were encouraged to run away to these outposts which put pressure on sparta to defend the homefront.

This phase of the war ended with the 50-year Peace of Nicias, which never really went into full effect, with both belligerents raiding each other through proxies from the onset.

Eventually directly in 415 BC, the Athenians devised a plan they believed would bestow upon themselves, an overwhelming advantage -- the conquest of the resplendently wealthy city-state of Syracuse, on the island of Sicily which, along with Athens and Carthage, controlled the lion’s share of Mediterranean trade, led by the young charismatic Athenian statesman Alcibiades.

The expedition ended in disaster, with Athens losing over 10,000 hoplites and two-thirds of her Navy. Ships could be rebuilt, but the 30,000 of her professional oarsmen could not be replaced.

This was followed by further disasters. Sparta freed 20,000 Athenian slaves from the city's silver mines. Athens then raised the tribute from her vassals, which caused widespread revolt in Ionia, for which this final stage of the war is famed.

When this war broke out it seemed to at least one Greek, an Athenian aristocrat named Thucydides, that it would be different, that it would be, as one modern scholar has suggested, ‘a war no other ’. Thucydides’ account of this war is at once analytic and philosophical, poignant and emotional.

His treatment of how two powerful states and their allies became locked in conflict has provided generations of historians and political scientists with an introduction to the subject of war and peace, war and violence, in general the ways of great powers.

Yet much of the modern treatment of the Peloponnesian War continues to examine the war much as Thucydides did – as a military and political conflict that unsuspecting readers might think took place in a social and cultural vacuum.

This is where the current book is different.

The author very candidly remarks, “This book does not answer that question through a strategic account of the conflict’s various campaigns. Much less is it a political study of the reasons that caused the Spartans to fight against Athens.

Fine narratives in English by George Grote, George Grundy, B. W. Henderson, Donald Kagan, John Lazenby, Anton Powell, Geoffrey de Ste. Croix, and others cover those topics. So there is no need for another traditional history of the Peloponnesian War.

Instead, how did the Athenians battle the Spartans on land, in the cities, at sea, and out in the Greek countryside?

What was it for those who killed and died in this horrific war, this nightmare about which there has been little written of how many Greeks fought, how many perished, or even how all of it was conducted?

The book’s aim, therefore, after a brief introduction to the universal events of the Peloponnesian War, is to flesh out this three-decade fight of some twenty-four hundred years past as something very human and thus to allow the war to become more than a far-off struggle of a distant age.

This book’s chapters are for the most part organized not by annual events but by the experience of battle: “fire” (the ravaging of the land), “disease” (plague), “terror” (coups and irregular fighting), “armor” (hoplite warfare), “walls” (sieges), “horses” (the Sicilian expedition), and “ships” (trireme fighting). These chapter themes are also interwoven with a loose ongoing narrative of the war, again with the understanding that each chapter draws on illustrations taken from the entire twenty-seven-year conflict.

No other struggle can provide such military lessons for the present as the Peloponnesian War. Of course, it was a Balkans-type mess—but also a conflict involving two great superpowers, as well as a war of terror, of dirty fighting in a Hellenic Third World, of forcing democracy down the throats of sometimes unwilling states, and of domestic and cultural upheavals at home brought on by frustrations of fighting abroad.

Most recommended for history buffs.






world-history2 s Callum71

'A War No Other' is a good introduction to Ancient Greek warfare and society. Victor Davis Hanson augments primary sources such as Thucydides and Xenophon, with secondary ancient texts, and modern archaeological literature. Rather than a chronological approach, Hanson provides a thematic analysis of the war. This method unveils the historical narrative whilst providing context and depth. Particularly attention is given to the destruction of Greek lives and society. The enduring lessons from the Peloponnesian War and this book provide insights into contemporary conflicts such as the Russo-Ukraine War.

After a decade of fighting, the Peace of Nicias ostensibly ended the Peloponnesian War in 421BC. However, this was only a bellus interruptem. The underpinnings of conflict--the rise of Athens and the fear that this instilled in Sparta, ideological differences, and fighting capacity--remained unresolved. Sparta emerged victorious after crushing Athens' navy at the later Battle of Aegospotami. This led to the destruction of the Athenian Empire, democracy, and military. Similarly, a premature peace between Ukraine and Russia would ly yield equally futile results.

Russia's invasion of Ukraine stemmed from their fear of losing influence to the US-dominated West. If a Russo-Ukraine peace agreement similar to the Peace of Nicias were reached now, in mid-2023, it would maintain the status quo ante. Despite Ukraine's aspirations for integration with the West, including the EU and NATO, significant proportions of its territory would remain under Russian occupation. Russia would continue to fear Ukraine's integration with the West and the Ukrainians would still fear Russian attacks. Thus, the US-led West must continue to support Ukrainian efforts to crush the Russian military, and subsequently integrate Ukraine into NATO while Russia is weakened. Only through this process can a lasting peace be achieved.2 s Lucas23

The author treats the reader as if the reader is mentally handicapped. Can’t go three pages without comparing a battle, a political policy, city-state, army or strategical decision with modern-day America, the nazis, Hitler, the nazis, the waffen-SS, the nazis. He repeats himself on and on again about the same facts, same information without adding anything new of value. The concluding chapter then just repeats what you have just read in an intellectually insulting way.

Just read Thucydides instead. historia2 s Dustin Abild4

I never had any interest in the Peloponnesian war, but a friend highly recommended the book so I gave it a go. Wow! What an insane time to be alive. The author paints a vivid picture of the time, describing all the battles and tactics in detail, while managing to keep it entertaining.2 s John235

I expected that I'd this book. I thought it would be pretty good. Then I started reading it, and by the time I finished I realized it was great. I've read my handful of VDH, but this book is really right in his wheelhouse. A classicist by training, he hits this out of the park, but not necessarily in the way one would think. It is historically engrossing, and a very tight narrative, but more than that it is exceptionally moving. Because the Peloponnesian War is not examined merely from a strategic point of view, but more by examining the nitty gritty of the conflict, we see how it was fought from the perspective of those you fought it. In that regard, Thucydides is an excellent choice (in reality the only choice) for a primary source. He lived during the conflict, fought in it, and interviewed people from both side to better understand the brutality and tragedy of the conflict.

The Peloponnesian War pitted Athens and her empire against Sparta, Thebes, Syracuse, Corinth, and various other city states. Lasting 27 years (431-404 BC), it was, as VDH points out in the title, no war before it. It was not short, or honorable, and lacked the moral clarity of previous conflicts. It was fought because fear and a desire for hegemony blotted out all over motives. Because this type of war was a new war, VDH walks us through specifically how it was fought. Sieges, hoplite warfare, trireme battles at sea, the necessity of horses, etc. We see the war from the ground, as if we stood in rank with the Mantineans as they marched to annihilation against Sparta's red-cloaked professionals in 418, or rowed in a trireme in Syracuse's Great Harbor as Athen's mission in Sicily was shattered in 413.

We meet many unforgettable characters, such as Pericles, Archidamus, Cleon, Nicias, Lysander, Demosthenes, Socrates (yes, that Socrates), and Alcibiades. Some were honorable men, while others were scoundrels and megalomaniacal killers.

Something that VDH does very well is placing this conflict in the greater scope of the story of ancient Greece. This conflict lies almost directly in the middle of the Persian wars of 490,480-79, and the Macedonian invasion of Greece in the 330s. How the former impacted the Peloponnesian War, and how the Peloponnesian War impacted the latter are critical details. Also, it has long been presumed that the Peloponnesian War marked the end of the Greek "Great Century," but when one looks at the excellent drama that was produced directly because of the war, how Platonic thought was influenced both by Socrate's and Plato's lives during the conflict, and how Thucydides's narrative was produced (as well as Xenophon's additions, as Thucydides narratives stops in 411), and finally when one examines the resurgence of culture in Athens following their defeat in 404, one must ask: would much of Greek history and the arts even exist without this war? It is not quite a counterfactual, but something that must be considered. I won't even get into the rise of Theban democracy--ultimately stemming from the war--that eventually dismantled a tyrannical Spartan state within 40 years.

All in all, a powerful book about a war that must be studied, as many conflicts in the subsequent 2400 years fall into pattern's very similar to the Peloponnesian War.2 s Justus636 94

Hanson's A War No Other is an idiosyncratic take on the Peloponnesian War. Rather than a strictly chronological take on the major battles & personalities, it approaches each chapter with a theme on the major ways people died. So there's a chapter devoted to hoplite battle, sure. But also one on plague. It isn't completely without chronology -- the earlier chapters focus more on the early parts of the war and the later chapters on the later parts. But it does result in a fair amount of back & forth. I found it an interesting approach, though I think if I had a better grounding in the Peloponnesian War it would have worked better. All I really knew about it came from playing the boardgame Athens & Sparta once or twice.

So maybe better as a second book on the war? Or at least read the Wikipedia page first?

His "themes not chronology" approach breaks down a bit towards the end. The chapter on "horses" is really about Sicily, where siegecraft and naval battles are arguably just as important. The chapter on naval warfare is so big that is spills out into two chapters, with one of them being a more or less chronological telling of the final Spartan naval campaign.

While Hanson makes a credible case for the Big Man of History, especially Alcibiades, influencing events I d that most of his focus was on big impersonal forces, the Greek lack of cavalry or weak siegecraft in general at that point in history. Some will find the high-level treatment of famous battles and personalities off-putting and will be better served with another book.

Hanson also has occasional casual asides that I d but others might not. For instance he (briefly) compares the coastal terror raiding of the Athenians & Spartans to modern terrorism. He talks about how one time he tried to cut down grape vines himself and discovered how hard -- nigh impossible -- it was. He mentions how even with modern ferries, tourists often become seasick in the waters around there -- so imagine how difficult it would have been to ferry horses 2,500 years ago. I d these small touches. The overall effect was one of an author who has a facile grasp of the themes & events of the war and is able to seamlessly relate them to things outside and beyond the war itself.2 s Scott425 4

Although it was fought 2,500 years ago, the Peloponnesian War continues to serve as a foundational event for Western civilization. The well-documented clash-of-cultures between democratic Athens and oligarchic/monarchic Sparta not only provides one of the first great Western histories (written by the Athenian general Thucydides), the war also provides more than enough cautionary tales to fill the syllabus of any class on strategic thinking, leadership, logistics, military tactics, or political science.

And yet, because it is so ancient, the Peloponnesian War is almost by definition bloodless for the modern student. Victor Davis Hanson has written several books about ancient Greece, and with "A War No Other," Hanson tries to humanize the war by writing about how the war was actually fought by the actual people. In this book, Hanson avoids providing yet another line-by-line assessment of Pericles' funeral oration or speculation on the shifting loyalties of Alcibiades. Rather, he breathes life into the soldiers and sailors who fought, bled and died in the war and what their experiences were .

While this is a nice effort and sounds it could be a rip-r0aring read, Hanson prides himself on being an historian. And many proud historians, Hanson's writing is quite dry. Think slightly overcooked roast chicken with a side of barely sauteed spinach. It's definitely a nutritious read - Hanson has done his homework - but a reader looking for passages to delight in will find them few and far between.

Hanson is often tagged with a "conservative" label. That really does not shine through here, other than perhaps with his selection of subject matter. This is a pretty straightforward history, and as someone who has enjoyed reading about the ancient Greeks I did enjoy it. But I'm now reading Robert Littel's "The Company" as a follow-up because I needed something with a little more sizzle.

Recommended.ancient-greece history military ...more2 s Dorum240

This, for me, was extremely useful to read. I have read Thucydides' work earlier this year. While some passages are obviously great, the sheer size of the work, and the amount of events, was baffling. A lot of the actions seemed nonsensical.

Victor Davis Hanson's work comes in to fill the gaps. For example I was finally able to understand why Brasidas decides to attack in North, or why the Delian sanctuary needed to be purified. Or why the Spartans weren't simply able to break down the long walls, or mantain a base in Attica for the first 20 years or so of the war.

This book is a kind and skilled professor explaining you in detail what you were too stupid to understand for yourself.2 s JJ5 2

As an enthusiast of ancient history, I was excited to start this book, that being said, it wasn't in a style that I enjoyed. Hanson broke down the war, not into stages, or years, but into the different styles of warfare. A lot of back and forth through history, and at times repetitive. I found Hanson's analysis of the political situations behind the military operations to be cursory and left much to be desired. 2 s William Gill140

Hanson recites a litany of abuse and tragedy concerning a multi-decade long war that ruined ancient Greece. It's really too much to digest.
I'm just glad I didn't have to live through it. And in hindsight, the democratic Athenians were even larger bastards than the oligarchic Spartans. Go figure. Maybe there is a good reason for the Electoral College after all.2 s E Stanton291 1 follower

This was an excellent history by one America's best classicists. Helps to have read Thucydides first. Would recommend to anyone who enjoys history at all, not just ancient or military history2 s Chris45 7

I thoroughly enjoyed Victor Davis Hanson’s ???A War No Other,” which I read as both an e-book and Audible audiobook. Additionally, I read it concurrently with “The Landmark Thucydides” (also Five Stars - look for my review at Goodreads.com). Both books I feel are indispensable to the military or classical historian, as well as anyone interested in a more complete understanding of the Peloponnesian War in particular, and Greek and Western culture in general.

“A War No Other” is a solid Five-Stars

If you are unfamiliar with the Peloponnesian War, don’t worry, you’ll find no spoilers here.

The Greeks were an irritable bunch, and despite the snow-capped mountain ranges and often treacherous seas that usually separated two poleis or city-states, they still found the motivation to make “war” on one another. However, the conflicts were usually short, sometimes only a day, and rather civil in comparison to our modern, total-warfare. Most combatants were heavily armored hoplites and the simple tactics were those of the phalanx. The resulting casualties were around 8%. With the battle over and the matter settled, under truce each side collected their dead, the winners would take whatever was fought over, set up a trophy, and everyone would march home and get back to business - which usually meant farming. But the Peloponnesian War (or, the Athenian War if you happen to have been a Peloponnesian) was different, it really was “a war no other.” For starters, it was a long war at 27 years (431 - 404 BC), it was a long time ago, (2450 years) and just about every Greek state fell in behind either Athens and the Delian League or the Spartans and the Peloponnesian League. Some call the Peloponnesian War the “first world war” because it encompassed so much of the Western world. I’m not sure I’d go that far, but I would call it the First Greek Civil War.

our own Civil War, the Peloponnesian War was an ugly, costly, and tragic endeavor. Atrocities were committed, cities were razed, great speeches were given, and many were starved, enslaved, and executed. By ancient standards the area of operations was large – from Sicily to Asia Minor, plus a widely-scattered panoply of islands, seas, rivers, settlements, cities, and territories. Not to mention the myriad of treaties and alliances between and within both leagues that were constantly being stretched, violated, and broken. With all that being said, it’s no wonder that truly understanding the Peloponnesian War can be a difficult thing to get your arms around.

Thank God for Thucydides because without him we would know very little about this war. He was an Athenian general until he was relieved of command and ostracized after losing a battle in northern Greece to a superb Spartan commander. However, Thucydides' loss was our good fortune because he now had the time to devote himself to writing a story “for all ages.” He is widely considered one of, if not THE greatest historian ever. So, for anyone with a desire to better understand the Peloponnesian war, without a doubt, the first step is reading and studying Thucydides’ “History.” And the best translation and editing is Robert B. Stassler’s, “Landmark Thucydides."

The next step (or for me, the concurrent step) is to read “A War No Other.” Why? Well, before I go there, it’s best that I clarify what “A War No Other” is NOT: it’s NOT another history of the Peloponnesian War or a political commentary, nor is it a strategic analysis of the 27-year conflict. Prof. Hanson’s “A War No Other” is more of a “drilling-down” - it’s 10 enlightening chapters, each addressing a different aspect of ancient warfare. If Thucydides tells you WHAT happened, Prof. Hanson explains HOW it may have happened, to what EFFECT; this is what the ARCHAEOLOGICAL EVIDENCE shows or this is the OPINION OF SCHOLARS. An example of the most latter can be found in Chapter 4, entitled “Terror: War in the Shadows (431-421),” Prof. Hanson writes:

“Peter Krentz has made the point that hoplite battle was not the primary means of fighting by counting up all the examples of deception and surprise attacks, often by night and fought by nonhoplites. * His thirty-seven instances in the Peloponnesian War dwarf the two large, set-piece hoplite encounters at Delium and Mantinea, and the smaller clashes of phalanxes at Solygia and Syracuse. Similarly, W. K. Pritchett collated forty-three examples of night attacks during the Peloponnesian War, engagements that were antithetical to the old idea of drawing up armies in broad daylight to settle the issue through infantry clashes.” (1)

“A War No Other” helps bring the Peloponnesian War into a clearer focus, it adds a fine layer of detail to Thucydides. Prof. Hanson begins by explaining why generals, statesmen, presidents, and kings have read Thucydides for 2 ½ millennia and why he’s still relevant today. Prof. Hanson takes you between the lines of Thucydides, often providing critical BACKSTORY behind a particular event or cite supporting ARCHAEOLOGICAL EVIDENCE. He might even (as I’ll cite just below) conduct an EXPERIMENT.

Prof. Hanson digs into the nitty-gritty of ancient Greek warfare to convey what it was for those who “killed and died” (2) on the Greecian battlefield. How was ancient naval warfare conducted? What was it to row in the bottom of a trireme? What happened when your vessel was rammed by another? What was the crew’s chance of survival? In several places, he highlights HISTORICAL PARALLELS. One example is found in Chapter 5 “Armor: Hoplite Pitched Battles (424-418):”

“Spartan ships, such as Alcidas’ armada, which had headed for Lesbos in 427, were capable only of short voyages akin to the German battleship Bismarck’s brief breakouts into the North Atlantic during 1941” (3)

And he doesn’t take Thucydides’ words necessarily at face-value, Prof. Hanson goes the extra mile and physically tests Thucydides’ claims. My favorite example is found in Chapter 2 “Fire: The War Against the Land (431-425).”

When Thucydides claims:

“Athens was being ravaged before the very eyes of the Athenians…” (Thucydides 2.21) (4)

Prof. Hanson experiments:

“The Spartan idea was to marshal the Peloponnesian League, invade Attica, destroy farmland, and hope that the Athenians came out to fight. Barring that, the strategy fell back on the hope that food lost at harvesttime would cause costly shortages at Athens…

But the hide of permanent plants is tougher than men’s. Orchards and vineyards are more difficult to fell than people, as the Peloponnesians quickly learned when they crossed into Attica in late May 431. Attica possessed more individual olive trees and grapevines than classical Greece did inhabitants. Anywhere from five to ten million olive trees and even more vines dotted the one-thousand-square-mile landscape. The city’s thousands of acres of Attic grain fields were augmented by far more farmland throughout the Aegean, southern Russia, and Asia Minor, whose harvests were only a few weeks’ transport away from Athens…

Partly in pursuit of that answer, a few years ago I tried to chop down several old walnut trees on my farm. Even when the ax did not break, it sometimes took me hours to fell an individual tree. Subsequent trials with orange, plum, peach, olive, and apricot trunks were not much easier. Even after I’d chainsawed an entire plum grove during the spring, within a month or so large suckers shot out from the stumps. Had one wished to restore the orchard, new cultivars could have been grafted to the fresh wild shoots. Apricot, peach, almond, and persimmon trees proved as tough. Olives were the hardest of all to uproot. It was even difficult to try to set them afire. Living fruit trees ( vines) will not easily burn-or at least stay lit long and hot enough to kill the tree. Even when I ignited the surrounding dry brush, the leaves were scorched, the bark blackened, but no lasting damage was done. Thucydides observes that the Spartans, during their fourth invasion of Attica in 427, needed to recut those trees and vines "that had grown up again" after their first devastations a few years earlier-a phenomenon of regeneration well recorded elsewhere of other such attacks on agriculture.” (5)

As a professional military scholar, Prof. Hanson understands the military value of terrain features, but as a farmer, he “sees” what most of us would not. For instance, I found it interestingly perceptive when he noticed much of the land surrounding Athens lies at different elevations. Because of this, fields of grain would ripen up to three weeks apart. That means that when the Spartans came to ravage Athenian agriculture, a percentage of their fields would still be green, and thus less ly to catch fire when they tried to set them ablaze.

The e-book contains extensive notes, a glossary of common Terms and Places, and from Alcibiades to Xenophon an appendix of the major players, works cited, and nine detailed maps.

The audiobook is 13 hours 58 minutes in length and excellent. I enjoy having the ability to listen anywhere and at any time with my Audible app on my phone or, even better, on one of my Amazon Echoes. It’s so nice to be outside, enjoying the weather and listening to an audiobook – and “A War No Other” is one of those books that is so packed with good information, you’ll enjoy listening to it several times. One of the things I enjoy about listening on an Echo is that I can say, “Alexa, rewind 10 seconds” or whatever if I missed something (not an Alexa advertisement, some of the others probably work also).

Narrator Bob Souer gets the job done with no mistakes for a solid Three Stars

Narrator Bob Souer’s voice is easy to listen to for 14 hours. But, except for a few Greek tongue-twister’s, which I expect a professional narrator to pronounce correctly, the book is straightforward with no character voices or the that might allow the narrator to shine. Souer does a good, albeit average, job and that’s why the three stars.

Overall:

“A War No Other” is a must-read for anyone wanting to better understand the Peloponnesian War

Time after time Prof. Hanson provided the detail I wanted (indeed, sometimes he provided details I didn’t know I wanted) to more thoroughly understand this crucial, relevant, and highly interesting period in history - I cannot think now of the Peloponnesian War without incorporating what I learned in “A War No Other.”

If you’re interested, I provided a link below to Prof. Hanson’s 2005 lecture from Book TV and C-SPAN2: (6)

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8zAlS...

LAST: I sincerely hope my review helped you! If so, please click LIKE/FOLLOW or send me a COMMENT. – Thanks!
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1. Hanson, chaps. 4 (Freda 24%) also see Note 2: P. Krentz, "Deception," 186–91; Pritchett, Greek State, 2.163–70. Hanson. (Freda 82%).
2. Hanson, sec. Prologue (Freda 2%).
3. Hanson, chap. 5. (Freda 32%).
4. Robert B Strassler and Victor Davis Hanson, The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War. (Riverside: Free Press, 1998), chap. 2.21.
5. Hanson, A War No Other, chap. 2 (Freda 12%).
6. A War No Other: The Peloponnesian War, accessed January 30, 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8zAlS....hist-greek loc-audible loc-folder ...more1 Joel Smith60 2

Victor Davis Hanson's A War No Other is not a re-capitulation of all of the things Thucydides wrote in his History of the Peloponnesian War. Hanson does not answer the question of why the Peloponnesian war was fought, but how. He is interested in the armour, the ships, the numbers, and most importantly, the experience of the soldiers and the citizens. He cites Thucydides, Xenophon, many contemporary playwrites, philosophers, and orators, and modern day geo-political analysts. This book is an excellent secondary source that provides immersion and context for Thucydides text. Hanson's approach is a more of a thematic approach rather than a chronological approach. He tries to keep things as chronologically accurate as well but when these two rails conflict, he chooses the thematic approach. He arranges his themes so that they are more chronologically sensible. For example, he puts his chapter on the invasion of the Attica at the beginning and he puts his chapter on ships toward the end because he only wants to deal with the Spartan victory at Aegospotamoi at the end. Hanson translates the horrific events to modern audiences by relating the magnitude of the war to what the magnitude would be today. While doing this, he is still able to keep the reader immersed in the world and war of the Greeks. The only fault I find in this book, a small omission, is the lack of discussion about the fault of Athenian democracy. It was precisely because of the "mob rule (Plato)" of Athenian democracy that the Athenians went on the disastrous Sicilian expedition in the first place. Hanson is right that it was an expedition that didn't have to fail. He is also right that the reward of victory would not be equal to the potential magnitude of destruction. However, Plato would also be right if he argued that it never had to happen in the first place. The fault isn't just on Alcibiades and Nicias but also on the people of Athens making a bad decision. This is a very small fault however and I am being nitpicky. I would recommend this book to the casual history buff and the student, teacher, or professor who wants to dive into Thucydides with a more full and familiar perspective.1 Chad Manske920 28

I have great respect for the writings of Hanson. His well-researched and thorough histories take readers down paths that realistically bring ancient history alive, and A War No Other is no exception! This work is a compelling and thought-provoking exploration of one of the most significant conflicts in human history, the Peloponnesian War. Hanson, a renowned classicist and historian, provides readers with a comprehensive analysis of this ancient Greek war that tore apart the mighty Athenian Empire and the Spartan-led Peloponnesian League in the 5th century BC. One of the book's standout features is Hanson's ability to make an ancient conflict relevant and relatable to modern readers. He skillfully draws parallels between the Peloponnesian War and contemporary geopolitical conflicts, making the book's lessons about power, politics, and human nature readily applicable to our world today. Through his insightful analysis, Hanson highlights the cyclical nature of international relations, emphasizing how the same patterns of rivalry, ambition, and conflict can be traced through the millennia. Hanson's deep understanding of classical history and military strategy shines through, allowing readers to gain a profound appreciation for the war's intricacies and the personalities involved. Additionally, the book offers a balanced perspective on the war, shedding light on the motivations and strategies of both Athens and Sparta, as well as the smaller Greek city-states caught in the crossfire. Hanson doesn't shy away from the brutal realities of war, including the devastating impact on civilians, cultural and societal upheaval, and the war's influence on the course of history. While A War No Other provides an excellent overview of the Peloponnesian War, it may be critiqued for its occasional complexity and the depth of detail it delves into. Some readers might find it overwhelming at times, especially those who are not well-versed in ancient history, but no matter, as Hanson often breaks these barriers down.1 ?????? ??????????17 2

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